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On 12 January 1995 Paul G. Kaminski, former Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), cited
Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) as an alternate practice to
be assessed by program managers when developing the
acquisition strategy for individual programs.  More
recently, the latest revision of the Department of Defense
Directive 5000.1, Defense Acquisition System, and
Department of Defense Regulation 5000.2-R, Mandatory
Procedures of Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major
Automated Information Acquisition Programs, support Mr.
Kaminski’s memorandum and encourage program managers to
continually search for innovative and efficient practices.  
These documents present an acquisition process used to
manage Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) in the
Department of Defense (DoD).  Under past traditional
approaches, the period from which the user generates the
requirement until the system is fielded can exceed 10
years.  This has resulted in users receiving weapon systems
with at least decade old technology to combat threats. 
The EA concept is a result of numerous acquisition
reform measures to reduce the time it takes to develop and
field weapon systems for the war fighter.  EA is defined as 
…an approach that fields an operationally useful
and supportable capability in as short a time as
possible.  The approach is particularly useful if
software is a key component of the system.  EA
delivers an initial capability with the explicit
intent of delivering improved or updated
capabilities in the future. (DoDI 5000.2, 2000,
23)
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The EA approach is intended to reduce the time for fielding
from over 10 years down to five years or less. 
Additionally, it is intended to provide the user an initial
capability that can be fielded against the original threat
and provide follow-on capabilities as they evolve.    
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The EA concept is the object of this research. This
study investigates the issues involved for the DoD to
successfully transition to an EA process for major weapons
procurement.  The ultimate goal is to provide contracting
officers and program managers insight on issues required to
successfully implement EA strategies.  This thesis will
provide contracting officers and program managers (PM) an
understanding of the issues required to successfully
transition to an EA approach.  An analysis of the issues
will provide the reader key insight when developing future
acquisition plans and strategies.
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question
• What issues must be addressed to allow the
Department of Defense to successfully utilize an
Evolutionary Acquisition approach?
2. Secondary Research Questions
• What is the background and history of
Evolutionary Acquisition? 
• What new requirements does this acquisition
approach place on the Department of Defense?  
• What are the possible effects of this new
acquisition approach on the defense industry?
• Is Evolutionary Acquisition a functional





D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This research is limited to analysis of EA for MDAPs
and the issues that must be addressed when this approach is
used.  The focus is on strategic issues associated with EA
rather than specific details.  The emphasis is on 
identification of issues from major participants in
acquisition, specifically PMs and contracting officers.   
While there may be similarities between EA and block
upgrades under the traditional approach, in this study each
approach is viewed as a distinct acquisition strategy.  
This research is limited by the availability of purely
EA programs to analyze.  This research has not identified
any programs that have used the EA approach or concept from
the beginning to end.  (Throughout this research the terms
approach and concept will be used interchangeably.)
Consequently, the study relies on opinions, beliefs, and
experiences of acquisition professionals who may have
differing ideas on EA.    
E. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this research consisted of
three primary areas: a literature search, a qualitative
survey and follow-up telephone interviews.  The literature
research traces the background and history of EA and
provides the reader a greater understanding of the benefits
of an EA approach to major weapon system procurement.
The qualitative survey was aimed at gaining an
understanding of the issues contracting and program
management personnel feel are important with respect to EA. 
The results, in turn, may provide guidance on how users
will employ EA in day-to-day use.  Survey input was
received from contracting and program management personnel
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from the various defense departments and members of the
Science and Technology community.  The survey was
distributed electronically to facilitate quick responses. 
A sample of the survey distributed is provided in
Appendices A and B.  Follow-up telephone interviews are
conducted with survey respondents to clarify responses.      
F. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH
This thesis is primarily intended to benefit DoD
acquisition personnel who specialize in major weapon
systems procurement.  This review will facilitate DoD
acquisition guidance on many of the issues, benefits and
concerns associated with using EA as an acquisition
strategy.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY  
Chapter I provides an introduction, the objective of
the research, the primary and secondary research questions,
the methods by which research data was collected, the
scope, limitations and assumptions of the thesis research,
the benefits of the research and organization of the study.
Chapter II introduces the EA process by providing an
historical background of the concept.  The chapter then
documents the traditional acquisition process and addresses
shortcomings with this approach.  The next section examines
the EA concept, the justification for using EA methods, and
the characteristics distinctive to the concept.  The
chapter then provides a detailed comparison of the two
acquisition approaches and concludes with misconceptions
associated with the EA approach.    
Chapter III provides an overview of the data
collected.  Additionally, it presents survey and follow-up
interview data with respect to the core competencies of
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contracting and program management.  The chapter concludes
by discussing EA as an improvement process, and identifies
the potential issues, barriers and concerns for this
approach.    
Chapter IV discusses and analyzes survey data using
the primary and secondary research questions as a basis for
discussion.  The chapter first looks at respondents’ issues
and concerns regarding EA’s effect on DoD and the Defense
industry.  The chapter concludes by addressing the issues
survey respondents believe are important under an EA
approach.
Chapter V presents the conclusions and recommendations
generated by this research.  It also provides areas of
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II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
Existing Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy statements
have provided a basis for formalizing the acquisition
processes used within the DoD.  OMB Circular A-109
identified seven “Major System Acquisition Objectives”. 
One of these objectives is to  
…tailor an acquisition strategy for each program,
as soon as an agency decides to solicit
alternative system design concepts, that could
lead to the acquisition of a new major system and
refine the strategy as the program proceeds
through the acquisition process. (OMB A-109,
1996, 3)    
This OMB objective emphasizes the desire to develop a
unique strategy for each program.  EA as a concept appears
to support this policy statement.  As defined in Chapter I,
DoDI 5000.2 states EA will “deliver an initial capability
with the explicit intent of delivering improved or updated
capabilities in the future.” (DoDI 5000.2, 2000, 23) While
efforts toward acquisition reform have led to EA becoming
the “preferred approach to satisfying operational needs”,
(DoDD 5000.1, 2000, 4) there is need to understand the
differences between the traditional and EA approach.  
This chapter presents a brief history of the EA
concept to show how the concept has progressed to its
current stature.  Next, the chapter will address the
perceived shortcomings of the traditional approach,
introduce the EA concept, and provide characteristics that
will assist acquisition managers in identifying candidates
for EA programs.  The chapter then compares the traditional
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and EA approaches and concludes by highlighting
misconceptions concerning the EA approach. 
B. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE EA CONCEPT
“The EA concept has been in existence in commercial
applications since the mid-1970s.” (USAF EA Guide, 2000, 1) 
It was first introduced in the military as a concept in
1987 as a future development in the Joint Logistics
Commanders Guide (JLCG).  Since then the advance of
Information Technology (IT) and rapid improvements in the
performance of computer hardware have led to the
availability of computer based, software intensive weapon
systems with unprecedented power and range of capabilities. 
These systems are so complex, and their technologies are
changing so rapidly, that the users have great difficulty
in specifying many of their detailed needs.  Advancing
technology challenged the DoD traditional acquisition
strategy, resulting in significantly extended acquisition
programs.  Without the ability to evolve, the traditional
acquisition strategy forced the war fighter to wait 10
years or more for a weapon system that may be both obsolete
and unable to counter the intended threat.   
Consequently, advances in technology are not easily
incorporated into weapon systems when the advances are
achieved after the development stage of the acquisition
process.  This results in weapon systems that fail to meet
the user’s expectations, cost too much and take too long to
develop.  Brigadier General Hirsch, U.S. Army (ret), a
professor at the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC),




Commanders will present the requirements to the
developers on a continuing basis as they evolve. 
Initial and subsequent increments of operational
capability will be defined, refined, funded,
developed, tested and fielded with continual
input from and evaluation by the user.  Neither
the user nor the developer can state now with
certainty and engineering specificity what one
needs and the other can produce.  Throughout an
acquisition process the user will continually
stress that the latest technology is incorporated
to provide the greatest advantage over the enemy.
(Hirsch, 1985, 39)
EA is an alternate approach, which by definition has
the capability to evolve with technology while giving the
user capabilities along the way.
Years of existence in the commercial market place and
its recent incorporation into the DoD procurement process
have shown that EA has not been a popular choice among
program or project managers.  That EA has not been more
widely used reflects the concern of those who approve and
fund acquisition strategies.  
There is concern that EA and similar strategies
are inherently risky.  Failures in recent years
in the development of complex systems by
traditional strategies have led to the painful
realization that these strategies also involve
significant risks for certain types of projects. 
The implication is clear: to acquire the systems
we need, we need to adopt more responsive and
iterative strategies, and we need to accept and
understand risks and control them. (Henderson and
Gabb, 1997, 2)   
Eighteen years ago, the United States debated the
utility of a space-based defense system – the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI).  An important part of the debate
was how to ensure command and control (C2) systems were
upgraded as technology advanced.  
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Generally, technology advances create new
capabilities never imagined.  In the realm of
software technology, where life cycles are
dramatically shorter than they are for hardware,
the technology that emerges from a fifteen-year
development program will indeed be obsolete. The
SDI was based on a traditional acquisition
approach and although it failed for several
reasons, one of the main reasons was the user and
developer expectations were not in line. (Cohen,
1997, 67)  
To provide guidance to the use of an EA strategy, DSMC
published in March 1987, the Joint Logistics Commanders
Guide for the Use of and Evolutionary Acquisition (EA)
Strategy in Acquiring Command and Control (C2) Systems. 
The guidance relied on the two major studies of past
acquisitions of C2 systems and “found that the use of
conventional approaches to acquisition of such systems has
led to unsatisfactory results.” (JLCG, 1987, 3)  The
systems considered in these studies were large, software-
dominated systems. 
DSMC then recognized that technology was becoming an
increasingly important factor in weapon systems and revised
its 1987 guidance.  In 1995, it published the Joint
Logistics Commanders Guide for Use of Evolutionary
Acquisition Strategy to Acquire Weapon Systems.  According
to DSMC 
Studies currently underway have examined the
acquisition environment likely to emerge from the
changed threat perception, rapid world economic
change and its associated technological
advancements and realignments.  It appears that
rapid change to most elements that affect the
acquisition process environment will preclude
those long periods of stability necessary to
develop clear definition of system operational
concepts, capabilities, and functions prior to
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entering EMD.  This implies the extension of EA
processes to systems other than C3I. (JLCG, 1995,
2-1)
In 1998, DSMC further revised its guidance to support
Defense Secretary Cohen’s “Joint Vision 2010”.  The Joint
Vision 2010 states, “America’s armed forces will channel
the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage
technological opportunities to achieve new levels of
effectiveness in joint military operations.” (QDR, 1997,
Sec. VII)  To support Secretary Cohen’s direction, DSMC
made minor changes to the JLCG to make it more responsive
to current and anticipated threats in 2010.  According to
DSMC
The EA philosophy and implementation instructions
have withstood the test of time.  The processes
described in this reissue of the 1995 document
retain their utility today.  The EA concept is no
longer simply a viable optional methodology for
acquiring new weapon systems. (JLCG, 1998, ix)
The above explanation indicates that, as technology
evolves, more complex systems require a different
acquisition approach.  Finally, in October 2000, Deputy
Defense Secretary, Rudy de Leon, approved the EA approach
and made it “the preferred approach to satisfying
operational needs.” (DoDD 5000.1, 2000, 4)      
C. THE DOD 5000 ACQUISITION MODEL
The DoD 5000 model (depicted below in figure 2.1) is
explained here to enhance the understanding of the
acquisition process and provide a basis for clarifying the
difference between the traditional approach and EA concept
in later sections.  The process of the DoD 5000 model is
paraphrased below and based on researcher notes from an
acquisition class taken at Naval Postgraduate School and
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DoDR 5000.2-R.  The acquisition class was titled
“Contracting for Major Systems”. 
Before an acquisition program is established, the
requirement and ultimately the mission need must be
developed through the requirements generation process.  In
weapon systems acquisition, the major Commanders in Chiefs
(CINCs) identify their requirements based on the National
Military Strategy.  The National Military Strategy is
derived from the President’s National Security Strategy and
provides the level of military power and presence the
Secretary of Defense is tasked with providing.


Figure 2.1. The DoD 5000 Acquisition Model.
(Source: DoDI 5000.2)

Within the U.S. Navy, the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) consolidates the CINCs requirements and
develops a Mission Need Statement (MNS).  The MNS is, in
turn, revalidated by the CINCs to verify it meets their
objectives and those of the National Military Strategy. 
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The CNO tasks a major Systems Commands to develop a
solution for this specific mission need.  It must be
understood that not all requirements are converted into
acquisition programs.  Some user needs can be filled with
non-material requirements.  
The non-material needs are given to the user for
resolution, and are generally met with changes in
doctrine, tactics, training, organization, etc. 
Material needs can ultimately be met by modifying
existing equipment or through buying a new
system.  In either case, material needs are
defined in a draft mission need statement.
[Keller, 1996, V-14] 
The graphical representation in Figure 2.1 shows the
framework of the acquisition model is divided into three
milestones.  Each milestone is further divided into phases
that identify specific work efforts.  The section below
provides a broad overview of the three milestones and the
phase components.    
1. Milestone A (Concept and Technology Development)
Before a Milestone A decision is made, the
requirements authority must both validate and approve the
MNS.  Once completed, the Milestone Decision Authority
(MDA) reviews the MNS for issues related to technology and
identifies possible alternatives.  A thorough analysis of
alternatives is completed and a decision is made to enter
Milestone A.  It must be understood that a favorable
decision does not mean a new acquisition program has been
initiated.  It means the entrance criteria for Milestone A
have been achieved.  
At Milestone A, the MDA is required to approve the
initiation of concept studies, approved exit criteria for
concept exploration and issue an Acquisition Decision
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Memorandum (ADM).  Beginning here and throughout the
acquisition process, Integrated Product Teams (IPT) are
used extensively in developing an evaluation strategy for
the MNS and milestone exit criteria.  The phase components
that support this milestone are Concept Exploration and
Component Advanced Development.  Concept Exploration
consists primarily of paper studies of alternative concepts
that may meet a specific mission need.  The alternative
concepts are developed through innovative and competitive
studies from the private and public (Office of Naval
Research, Center of Naval Analysis, other federally funded
research and development centers, educational centers and
non-profit organizations) Science and Technology (S&T)
community.  Promising concepts are evaluated for risk,
cost, schedule, performance and other key management
requirements.  
At this point the MDA conducts a decision review to
determine if additional component development is required. 
A further development decision requires the concept(s) to
progress to Component Advanced Development.  Herein,
additional contracts and studies are conducted to further
reduce risk at the system and subsystem levels.  Work
efforts are guided by the MNS but an Operational
Requirements Document (ORD) is developed to support program
initiation.  Efforts here are followed by a MDA Milestone B
decision review.  The Milestone B decision review consists
of an acquisition strategy, a program protection plan and
other key management tools to support program initiation. 
Most Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) are
initiated at Milestone B, thus a favorable decision review
initiates the beginning of an acquisition program.  
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If technology is mature, the Milestone B decision
review can occur after the Concept Exploration phase or
after the Component Advanced Development phase when
additional development is complete. 
2. Milestone B (System Development and
Demonstration) 
With exit criteria from Milestone A achieved, a
program is initiated and enters Milestone B.  This
milestone has two phases, System Integration and System
Demonstration, separated by an Interim Progress Review. 
The program acquisition strategy is now defined for both
this milestone and future full capability.  The PM and
acquisition executives now determine if an evolutionary or
traditional acquisition approach is warranted.  The
approach to follow depends on the time-phased requirements
of the ORD, maturity of technology, relative costs and
benefits for progressing the program in evolutionary blocks
versus a traditional single step.  Unless other overriding
factors are present, technology maturity dominates the
decision in choosing an approach.  
The objective of Milestone B is to develop concepts
into producible and deployable products that provide
capability to the user.  Accomplishment of this objective
coincides with program risk reduction, supportability,
affordability, system integration, interoperability and
utility.    
Technology is developed in the S&T community or
procured from private industry.  Milestone B approval can
lead to System Integration or System Demonstration. 
Hardware-intensive systems generally move from one phase to
the next while software-intensive systems combine both
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phases into a build-test-fix-test-deploy process.  In
either case, the program will enter System Integration when
the PM has a system’s architecture, but has not yet
integrated the subsystems to make a complete system.  The
program will exit System Integration when integration of
the system has been demonstrated in a relevant environment. 
Demonstration is conducted using prototypes to integrate
subsystems and reduce risk.  Once complete, an Interim
Program Review is conducted by the MDA to determine if the
program is progressing or needs adjustment.  A successful
review enters the program into the next phase.
With the prototype articles demonstrated, the program
enters the System Demonstration phase.  This phase ends
when a system is demonstrated in its intended environment,
using engineering development models or integrated
commercial items; meets validated requirements; establishes
industrial capabilities are reasonably available; and
receives MDA approval.  Accordingly, the program must
simultaneously meet or exceed exit criteria and Milestone C
entrance criteria.  Modeling and simulation is the
preferred demonstration method when a proven capability
exists.    
3. Milestone C (Operations and Support)  
Milestone C entrance criteria are mature technology,
an approved ORD, acceptable interoperability, acceptable
operational supportability, demonstrated system
affordability, acceptable information assurances and anti-
tamper provisions.  The MDA shall confirm the acquisition
strategy is approved prior to release of the final Request
for Proposal and approve an updated acquisition program
baseline, low-rate initial production (LRIP) exit criteria
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and the acquisition decision memorandum.  The purpose of
this milestone is authorized entry into LRIP or limited
deployment for MDAPs.  
The LRIP decision is intended to result in development
of an adequate and efficient manufacturing capability while
minimizing the production quantity necessary to conduct
proper initial testing and evaluation (IOT&E).  The
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and
cognizant OIPT Leader approve the Test and Evaluation
Master Plan (TEMP) used to evaluate the system in a fielded
operational environment.  Successful testing from IOT&E
community is followed by a MDA full-rate production
decision review.  A successful review, combined with proper
reporting to Congress, Secretary of Defense and USD (AT&L),
results in full-rate production and deployment.  
Fielded systems must be supported by adequate
logistics and support elements.  The Sustainment phase
provides the readiness and operational support capabilities
necessary to maintain the system through its useful life. 
The Sustainment phase will incorporate and support follow-
on operational testing, system upgrades, interoperability,
and survivability issues.  
At the end of its useful life, a system must be
demilitarized and disposed of.  The PMs acquisition
strategy addresses demilitarization and disposal
requirements. Specifically, the Disposal phase exists so
that removal of the system from service is carried out in
accordance with legal and regulatory requirements.  
Variations of this milestone process are numerous but
the basics of the acquisition process are described herein. 
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OMB A-109 describes these steps/milestones as an iterative
process.
As more knowledge of needs, alternatives
solutions, actual capabilities, resource and
priorities are acquired, some steps in the
overall major systems cycle may be iterated, as
necessary, to permit decisions to be made in a
total system context. (Henderson and Gabb, 1997,
5]
Throughout the process, the program manager (PM) must
communicate how the steps of the acquisition process are to
be conducted, given the resources and constraints the
program is subject to.  Contracting personnel, industry,
logisticians, testers, engineers, CINCs, other users and
Congress are just a few of the players involved.  All must
understand the plan is to produce the system within budget,
and on time while, meeting the user’s requirements as
defined in the ORD.  The acquisition strategy communicates
necessary information to all concerned, allowing them to
plan and support the PM’s goals.  The DSMC defines an
acquisition strategy as
A business and technical management approach
designed to achieve program objectives with in
specified resource constraints.  It is the
framework for planning, organizing, staffing,
coordinating, and leading a program.  It provides
a master schedule for research, development,
test, production, fielding and other activities
essential for program success and for formulating
functional strategies and plans. (DSMC
Acquisition Strategy Guide, 1999, 1-1)
The acquisition strategy incorporates milestones and
other reviews throughout the process to define points in
the acquisition process that are critical for the
successful eventual fielding of a program.  According to
the Defense Acquisition Deskbook
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Phases and other decision points facilitate the
orderly transition of broadly stated needs into
system-specific performance requirements and a
stable design that can be produced efficiently. 
They provide the context within which a system is
designed, developed, and deployed during its life
cycle. (DAD, 2000)
While use of the DoD-5000 model is required, the
acquisition process itself is not defined by it.  Every
acquisition is unique.  Program Managers must assess each
program individually to determine where in the acquisition
model the program commences.  The goal of acquisition
executives and PMs must be to “ensure each acquisition
strategy incorporates common sense, sound business
practices, applicable laws and regulations and the time-
sensitive nature of the user’s requirement.” (DoDD 5000.1,
2000, 6)  
D. TRADITIONAL APPROACH SHORTCOMINGS
The current DoD 5000 model was developed in response
to a traditional way of managing programs.  In the past a
more lockstep or inflexible approach to program management
was the norm.  It is possible to successfully manage a
program using the traditional approach but based on its
inflexible nature there are many shortcomings.  The purpose
of this section is to highlight these shortcomings and
provide a picture to show the distinctions between the
traditional and EA approaches.  Based on this perspective,
the researcher has identified several perceived
shortcomings of the traditional model.
1. Increased Cycle Time
“The average cycle time for MDAPs since 1960 has been
132 months or 11 years.” (Johnson, 1999, 8) Systems that
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require reduced cycle time are challenged by the
traditional approach.  
2. Inability to Handle Rapidly Changing Technology  
Systems that are incorporate rapid changing technology
are difficult to upgrade and maintain.  “Traditional
acquisition models often result in the delivery of systems
with obsolescent computer hardware, due to the high speed
of computer technology.” (Henderson and Gabb, 1997, 11)
3. Inflexibility to New Requirements 
“The PM needs a process that accepts and encourages
evolutionary practices.” (Axiotis, 2000, 1)  Axiotis states
in this article that an evolutionary process is required
because the traditional process relies on clearly defined
end-states and cannot adjust for new or changing
requirements.  
4. Lack of User Involvement
As discussed in the DoD 5000 model above, user
involvement is primarily at the beginning and end of the
program.  When the traditional approach is used to manage a
program user involvement remains low.  Because the
traditional approach can take 10 years or more, this lack
of user interface can create confusion and lack of
information flow between the user and program office.
5. Inflexibility to COTS/NDI Inclusion
“The objective is to infuse upgrades into our system,
which are not fundamental performance upgrades, without
painting them as new-start acquisitions.” (Axiotis, 2000,
2)  Axiotis believes the traditional approach is inflexible
to COTS/NDI inclusion beyond Milestone C of the DoD 5000
model.  From an OT&E perspective, this lack of flexibility
leads to longer and more complex operational tests.”
(Axiotis, 2000, 2)    
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E. THE EA CONCEPT
Based on a detailed literature review and
conversations with contracting and program management
personnel, this researcher has found no programs in DoD
that have totally incorporated EA concepts throughout the
program life cycle.  Many programs may reflect some aspects
of EA, but a pure EA program is currently only an ideal.
The process flow of the EA concept follows that of the
5000 model.  Like the traditional approach, each EA concept
should follow the milestones/phase methodology.  The major
difference is that, internally, the EA concept contains
several traditional acquisitions that outline requirements
from the core (initial) through the final capability.  
Figure 2.2 depicts the EA concept with focus on the
ORD.  As discussed in the DoD 5000 model, the ORD is
developed in the later part of Milestone A, the same is
true for the EA concept.  Each incremental ORD requires an
acquisition strategy, a program protection plan and other
key management tools to support the incremental ORD.  A
successful Milestone Decision Review allows the incremental
ORD to enter Milestone B and continue as the model depicts. 
Once the program is complete, the next incremental ORD is
introduced and the process repeats until the final
capability is achieved.  Occasions can occur for
incremental ORD development to overlap.  The Air Force
Evolutionary Acquisition Guide provides a basis for
discussing the EA concept in Figure 2.2.  
The incremental ORDs represent all requirements, KPPs
and other performance parameters, from the core through the
final capability.  The core is the initial agreed upon set
of requirements to be delivered first and provides a useful
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and supportable capability.  According to the figure the
core is: “Core = KPP(T1)+ KPP(T2) + … O(1) + O(2)…”.  This
terminology means the first two KPPs and other performance
parameters are achieved in the core capability.  
The increments represent the agreed upon incremental
deliveries of additional capabilities.  There can be
several increments, the number of increments depends upon
evolving requirements, evolving technology and funding
availability.  According to the figure the first increment
is: “I(1) = KPP(T3) + KPP (T4) … + O(3) + O(4) …”.  This
terminology means the first increment will incorporate KPPs
and other performance parameters 3 and 4.  
These equations show a typical example of how the
requirements can be spread between the core and incremental
capabilities.  The KPPs within each increment are generally
successive and build upon the previous increment while
other performance parameters may be addressed in a
different sequence.  
The timeline could represent a potential development
and delivery schedule for the EA concept.  For example,
Increment I(1) could be initiated when the requirements are
defined and stable funding is available.  In the majority
of cases, because the I(1) capability is dependent on the
core it will not follow until the KPPs from the core are
achieved.  The extensive overlap of the core and increments
in Figure 2.2 is not intended to depict that follow-in
increments are developed before the previous increment is
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Figure 2.2. EA Concept.
(Source: Air Force EA Guide)

A basis for DoD moving to this EA concept is supported
by Secretary Cohen’s direction for the innovation of people
and leveraging of technology.  The EA concept should
support this measure because it intends to improve the
acquisition process by reducing cycle time, providing
initial capability sooner and upgrading technology in the
future.    
Some successful management practices from recent
military developments have been drawn upon to help define
characteristics of the EA concept:
F-117 Tactical Fighter – This program has become
a hallmark of successful acquisition practice. 
During a brief period in the 1980s, this highly
advanced system was developed and fielded as a 59
aircraft wing, typical of smaller battle group
deployments likely in the future.  The
development for fielding was very short; non-
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value technical, management and financial
reporting was excluded; and long-term financial
stability was emphasized to avoid year-to-year
incremental funding disruption. 
Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) System
– THAAD uses DOD-5000 phasing in a relatively
positive way.  During Phase I, an initial missile
defense capability to combat today’s basic
threats is fielded for user operational
evaluation.  Phase II is to develop system
upgrades for expanded capability.  THAAD’s
strategy is important because it breaks away from
the traditional process for basic fielding and
shortens development cycle time. 
X-31 Aircraft – This cooperative effort between
the U.S. and Germany used bare bones funding,
contract tasking and solid teamwork to fashion
the first new X-Model program in decades.  I was
managed using approved contractor plans and, much
like the F-117, it uses existing subsystems in
areas not critical to its advanced combat
aerodynamics. (NCAT, 1996, 4-5)
Lessons from the above acquisitions and many others
laid the groundwork and policy basis for creating the EA
concept.  The results of these lessons helped in
determining characteristics for using the EA concept. 
These characteristics are discussed in section G.  
F. JUSTIFICATION FOR EA
A justification for using the EA concept as an
improvement process can be characterized by Harrington’s
text, Business Process Improvement (BPI).  He states three
main objectives of the improvement process: “making process
effective, making processes efficient, and making processes
adaptable.  These objectives are paraphrased with
supporting issues:
Step 1: Making Processes Effective – producing the
desired result.
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With full support and stable funding, EA can be an
outstanding method of providing the user an interim
capability and full capability later.  The major drawback
with the traditional approach is that life cycle timeframes
exceed 10 years.   Based on EA methods the user should
receive some level of capability, generally, within three
to five years.  If EA can maintain full support and
funding, by design it should be a more effective process.  
Step 2: Making Processes Efficient – minimizing
resources used.
By design, the EA concept should be most effective
when it is used on large software intensive systems that
require some range of human interaction.  The incremental
nature of EA should allow the concept to take advantage of
commercial NDI’s and dual-use technologies.  If this is the
case, the commercial market should set the price and allow
DoD to use less DoD specific resources.  
There is concern that the follow-on increments in
route to full capability will produce a burden on
configuration management and ultimately increase life cycle
costs.  The open systems approach has been used with
success under the traditional approach for some time. 
There will be multiple configurations under an EA approach,
however, there should be an efficient transition to full
capability if the system is truly open.  Significant cost
may be an attribute in the short-run, but with support and
stable funding the long-term benefits should relate to
lower cost.
Step 3: Making processes adaptable – being able to
adapt to changing user needs
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The basic structure of EA is evolving technology that
is designed to meet the user’s needs in as short of a
period as possible.  Throughout the evolutionary process
the ORD is re-validated to ensure program direction meets
the needs of the user.  Specific capabilities are based on
the perceived threat outlined by the CINCs and the National
Military Strategy.  An argument can be made that EA is an
adaptable process and it meets the changing needs of the
user.  
G. CHARACTERISTICS OF AN EA MODEL
Just as in the traditional approach, EA is a
challenging process that requires dedication to the process
from initial through final capability.  Because every
program acquisition is not suitable for EA, it is necessary
to identify characteristics that are appropriate to the EA
concept.  The Joint Logistics Commanders Guide describes
six characteristics of an EA model.  These characteristics
are identified with supporting comments below: 
1. A General Description of the Functional
Capability Desired for the Full System
This broad description of the system must be known
before design and development are started.  As much as
possible requirements must bound and not allowed to move
outside the functional capabilities identified.  An example
of this is the phasing aspect of the THAAD system.  The
phase aspect allows the PM to provide an initial capability
for the short term and identify the full capability in the
follow-on phase(s).  This phased approach provides a
general description of what the user requested in the




2. A Concise Statement of Operational Concepts for
the Full System
There must be detailed information about the minimal
operational aspects of the system and preferably some of
the early increments should be defined.  All operational
aspects must be refined as early in the program as
possible.  The THAAD system is an example for the same
reasoning identified.  
3. A Flexible, Well-Planned Overall Architecture, to
Include Process for Change, which Will Allow the
System to be Designed and Implemented in an
Incremental Way with Minimum Regression Testing  
The system architecture must have the capability to
support the incremental functions that are delivered with
each release.  This includes those functions for which
detail requirements have not been defined.  The system
architecture must be flexible, scalable and maintainable. 
The F-117 is an example of this characteristic because it
emphasized long-term financial stability.  This allowed the
program to progress incrementally and minimize regression.
4. A Plan for Incrementally Achieving the Desired
Total Capability which Adheres to Life Cycle Cost
Effectiveness
Programs should be divided in various phases and
increments.  Each increment will result in the development
of functions that enhance and increase the overall
capability of the system.  Each increment may involve mini
acquisition within that may encompass the various
milestones and phases of an EA strategy.  An example of
this is the upgrade of the Navy Tactical Command Support
System (NTCSS).  This program attained life cycle cost
effectiveness through an ambitious installation schedule. 
“The program achieved cost avoidance of $753.3M and a
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productivity benefit of $744.1M over the program 15-year
life cycle.” (www.acq-ref.navy.mil, 2001)      
5. Early Definition, Funding Development, Testing,
Fielding, Supporting and Operational Evaluation
of an Initial Increment of Operational Capability  
As soon as possible, contracts for the first phase,
the minimal system, plus any additional increments must
awarded.  The capabilities and funding levels needed for
further increments must be addressed separately. 
Determinations must be made during each increment if
competition can be achieved or the same supplier will be
used.  No specific example is available because this
research has not found a program that used EA fully from
the initial concept through to fielding.
6. Continual Dialogue and Feedback among Users
Developer, Supporters and Testers  
There must be dedication by all involved in the
process to ensure requirements are continually reviewed. 
Specifically, users can provide critical data about early
increments being used in an operational environment.  The
Navy Battle Force Tactical Trainer (BFTT) Electronic
Warfare Trainer (BEWT) supports this characteristic.  “In
addition to early teaming with the customer, BEWT
acquisition established of an Integrated Logistics Support
(ILS) arm, and a BEWT Support Office (BFSO).” (ACQN Reform
Website)    
H. COMPARING THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH AND EA CONCEPT
The traditional acquisition approach is the framework
that has guided the development of weapon systems from
concept exploration to fielding.  OMB A-109 and subsequent
DOD instructions emphasize tailored approaches and do not
preclude the use of commercial technology and best business
practices.  The above examples are unique in that they
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follow this guidance and show how acquisition managers
manage risk (cost, performance, schedule) so that programs
can progress forward.  Although these successes are based
on the traditional approach, there was extensive use of
long-term financial support, incremental capability, and
life-cycle reductions.  In this section, we will look at
traditional and EA procurement approaches.  Figure 3.1
outlines these two models and highlights from a broad
perspective their differences.  
The figure specifically addresses the level of user
insight.  Users are defined as the major CINCs and Type
Commanders (TYCOMS).  Under the traditional approach, the
level of user insight begins fairly high but falls off
until the integration and testing phase.  With user
involvement being limited to the beginning and end of the
process, changes under the EA approach are more difficult
to make.  As outlined in the figure, this model is not
appropriate for unprecedented systems and systems in a
changing environment.        
Unlike the traditional approach, the EA approach is dynamic
and provides capability to the users in varying increments
or stages.  The EA approach provides an integrated process
that allows users, developers and PMs to interface and
validate the status of the program from fielding of the
initial to the final capability.  Because the user is
continually involved, adjustments to the core requirements
are fairly straightforward.  The major drawback to this
approach is uncertainty.  Constantly improving and
developing technology creates difficulty in ascertaining
risk associated with cost or schedule.  In short,
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Figure 2.3. Traditional (Standard) and Evolutionary
Approach.
(Source: DSMC Acquisition Strategy Guide)

To fully show the differences in the two approaches,
the researcher provides a breakdown by category of each
model.  Table 3.1 below outlines eight major issues that
are distinctive to either acquisition approach.  The
comparison is for a “typical” program initiated from the






 Traditional Acquisition Evolutionary Acquisition

Requirements Requirements are known at
the start and remain stable
throughout the program.
Requirements are broadly
defined.  They evolve and
are refined as the
program develops. 
Design/Technology Determined Early in the
Program or when mature.
The basic architecture
and initial functions are
determined early, but the
detailed designs and
other functions evolve. 
Cutting edge but fully
tested.





Delivery Single Delivery Phased or Incremental
Delivery
Contract Competition One or one set of
competitive proposals. 
Winner awarded the entire
system contract.
One or one set of
competitive proposals for
the Phase/Increment I
contract.  Follow on
phase/increments may or
may not be competed
individually.  
Acquisition Cost Known based an awarded
contract.  Capped based on
contract type.
Known based on the Phase
I contract.  Follow-on
phases are estimated and
capped.
User Involvement Relatively Low User involvement
essential and is required
to determine future phase
requirements.
Risk Performance: Higher because
of the single step approach.
One chance at success.













Cost: Higher because of




Table 2.1. Comparisons of the Traditional and EA
Approaches.
Sources: USAF EA Guide, Henderson and Gabb, JLCG (1998) and
DoDR 5000.2-R 4, 6, 14, and 20

I. MISCONCEPTIONS
The purpose of this section is to elaborate on the
many misconceptions about EA in respect to terminology and
methods.  Much of this background is not captured or quoted
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from a specific author or instruction.  Its verification is
backed by conversations with instructors, contracting
officers, program managers and reading on the subject of
EA.  
1. EA is Simply an Incremental Acquisition 
“EA’s main difference from incremental acquisitions is
that the requirements are intended to evolve during
development, by comparison, incremental acquisition is much
more rigid in its approach.” (Henderson and Gabb, 1997, 10) 
An incremental acquisition is similar to the traditional
acquisition, except that system design, development and
production may occur in a series of increments. 
Incremental acquisition is often managed under a single
contract.  It differs from EA because the requirements and
often the design are stable before system development
begins. 
2. EA is Simply a Phased Acquisition 
This type of acquisition is typically used where there
are serious risks, uncertainties or difficulties when
planning a program.  It provides decision points (and often
delays) between the phases, when the direction of a project
may be significantly changed.  There is generally more
certainty in an EA program, even though EA can be viewed as
a phased approach.  An EA program does not have delays
between the phases.  There is always continuous planning
for both current and future phases/increments.  All breaks
or delays between phases are eliminated.
3. EA is Simply a Strategy to Avoid Formal Funding
Procedures  
EA is seen by some to be inherently flexible because
it presents the opportunity to gain approval of a program
before the program objectives and risks are defined.  This,
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however, is far from the truth.  EA must have a well-
defined core capability and associated risks must be
identified.  Under the DOD 5000 Model, a user need or idea
is not a program until it successfully enters Milestone B. 
One of the many requirements for Milestone B is to have a
defined acquisition strategy of which risk reduction is a
key component.  Additionally, the ORD identifies the
initial core capability that will be achieved by the
acquisition strategy.  Milestone B does not require all
risk to be removed, but it does require risk to be
acceptable and controllable based on a defined core
capability.  Therefore, the time-phased approach of EA does
not provide the basis to circumvent the requirements and
secure funding. 
4. EA is Simply a Prototyping Approach
EA does not result in the delivery of prototypes. 
Systems fielded using EA are subject to the appropriate
development standards and quality controls of the DOD-5000
model.  Prototypes are not always subject to these rigorous
measures and are not suitable for operational use. An
example of this is the X-31 program.  Many of the advanced
combat aerodynamic characteristics can be used to improve
future DoD aircraft.  “Experience gained from the use of a
the prototype may determine that a traditional acquisition
model can be used from that point forward.” (Von, 1990, 6)
5. EA is Simply a Remedy for Poor Requirements
It is a common fallacy that EA is an ideal strategy
for use when the basic user needs are difficult to
identify.  Although EA can accommodate changes in
requirements and provides early incremental additions for
users to use, inadequate requirements will increase cost
and schedule.  This will often prevent the fine-tuning of
34 
the incremental additions, which is the strength of EA. 
“Attempting to compromise sound development practices with
the intent of satisfying requirements through evolvability
will only aggravate the very problem we are trying to
solve.” (Thayer and Merlin, 1990, 3)   
J. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The foregoing information provides a historical
perspective of the EA concept and how it has evolved to its
current status.  The chapter then focuses on the
traditional acquisition approach.  The traditional
acquisition process is described and is followed by several
shortcomings of this process.  The chapter focus then
changes to address the EA concept.  The EA concept is
explained and is followed by a justification for using EA
and characteristics distinctive to the concept.  A
comparison of the two approaches is then presented to
further identify the issues within each approach.  The
chapter concludes by providing several misconceptions of
the EA concept.  
The next chapter outlines the methodology and
presentation of data.  Data presented are based on survey
results from contracting and program management personnel. 
The survey data will be presented in a format that supports
answering the primary and secondary research questions.  
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III.METHODOLOGY AND DATA PRESENTATION
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the researcher presents results from
two surveys, the baseline data for this research.  The
objective of the surveys is to collect data from
experienced contracting and program management personnel
(respondents) who work currently or previously on a MDAP. 
The questions from both surveys concern the EA approach and
how this concept affects the core competencies of
contracting and program management.  The survey also
addresses EA as a business function and questions
respondents to determine if they believe EA is a process
improvement.  The survey concludes by questioning
respondents concerning the issues, barriers and concerns
that must be addressed to successfully implement the EA
approach.  Survey data are presented in section C of this
chapter.
B. SURVEY METHODOLOGY
The two surveys, provided in their entirety in
Appendices A and B, were distributed to contracting and
program management personnel from Navy, Air Force and Army
activities that contract for or support MDAPs.  Survey
respondents’ experience levels ranged from teaching in an
academic environment through managing an Acquisition
Categories (ACAT) I through IV MDAPs.  The surveys were
conducted online, requiring respondents to simply access a
link to the survey, complete the survey and forward the
results to a central collection database at Naval
Postgraduate School.  The researcher received 42 responses
total, 26 responses on contracting and 16 responses on the
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program management surveys.  With the exception of five
questions, the surveys requested essentially identical
information.  Two of these questions dealt with core
competencies of contracting personnel, and three dealt with
core competencies of program management personnel.      
Of the 26 respondents from the contracting survey, 18
were from the Navy, 3 were from the Army, 3 from the Air
Force and 2 from the Defense Contract Management Agency
(DCMA).  A breakdown by service and contracting activity is
outlined below.  
Navy: 
Naval Air Systems Command      11 Respondents
Naval Sea Systems Command   5 Respondents
Space and Warfare Command   1 Respondent
Office of Naval Research    1 Respondent
Army:  
Communications and Electronics Command 2 Respondents
Aviation and Missile Command   1 Respondent
Air Force:
Aeronautical Systems Center   2 Respondents
Aeronautical Aviation Center   1 Respondent
Defense Contract Management Agency  2 Respondents

Of the 16 respondents from the program management
survey, 5 were from the Navy, 4 were from the Army and 7
from the Air Force.  A breakdown by department and activity
is outlined below. 
Navy:
Naval Sea Systems Command   5 Respondents
Army: 
Aviation and Missile Command   3 Respondents
Army Material Command    1 Respondent
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Air Force:
Air Force Material Command   4 Respondents
Air Force Institute of Technology  3 Respondents

The contracting and program management surveys were
developed to collect information in nine main areas:  
• Demographics:  Name and contact information of
respondent (optional)
• The effect of EA on competition requirements in
DOD.
• The advantages and disadvantages of EA in respect
to the defense industrial base.    
• The effect EA has on risk management.
• The effect EA will have on the contracting and
program management workforce.    
• The effect EA will have on Multi-Year Procurement
funding.  
• The role of market research under an EA approach.
• Whether EA is a functional improvement over the
traditional approach.  
• The issues, barriers or concerns that must be
addressed before the EA concept can be successful
implemented in DOD.
These nine areas were selected based on preliminary
literature research and conversations with contracting
officers and program managers.  The objective was to
identify core competencies that are critical to effectively
use the EA concept for MDAPs.  
C. SURVEY RESPONSES
Survey responses are presented in the following
paragraphs.  Follow-up interviews were conducted with
several respondents and other DOD acquisition managers to
clarify responses and address concerns.  Where appropriate
this follow-up information is presented.  First, the
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researcher will discuss the purpose of the information
requested under that question’s area of focus.  Second, the
researcher will paraphrase the responses.  Finally, the
researcher will present a summary of the responses.  
1. Competition
a. Purpose 
The first area of focus was on competition and
how it relates to major weapon system acquisition.  FAR
Parts 6 and 34 govern these requirements for competition
and state that: 
…the program manager shall promote full and open
competition, sustain effective competition
throughout the acquisition, and shall sustain
competition as long as it is economically
beneficial and practicable to do so.  The
contracting officer is responsible for timing the
solicitation issuance and contract award to
maintain the integrity of the acquisition
process. (FAR, 2001, 780)  
The responses to the question, do you think EA
will have a negative effect on competition are paraphrased
below.
• Competition after the core capability is
developed and fielded could be negatively
affected if the government does not own program
data rights. 
• Accelerated delivery or shorted life cycles could
hinder some contractors from presenting
proposals.  This all depends on the
infrastructure of each potential contractor.
• If the requirements are inadequately identified
some contractor may lean to the side of caution
and not submit proposals.  
• When a contractor is chosen as prime for the
initial phase or core capability, he has an
inherent advantage of receiving all follow-on
phases or increments of the acquisition program.     
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• Even though long-term partnering creates program
stability it could negatively affect competition. 
We must be able to weight program stability and
reduced life-cycle costs against possibly
diminishing potential contractors from follow-on
contract awards and the defense industrial base.  










Table 4.1. Will EA Have a Negative Affect on
Competition.
Source:  Developed by Researcher

b. Summary
There appears to be a spectrum of answers in
response to this question.  The majority of respondents
(21) did not believe EA would have a negative affect on
competition.  A significant portion, (12), of respondents
“did not know” what effect EA will have on competition. 
Several follow-up calls were to these respondents and the
overwhelming response was that they were leaning toward an
answer of “yes”.  This was especially prevalent with
contracting personnel.  The result is a 60/40 split for
contracting personnel who believe competition will be
negatively effected.  The preponderance of the responses
from the program management side stated competition would
not be negatively affected.
The theme of the respondents who believe
competition will be negatively affected is focused in three
major areas: data rights ownership, requirement
identification and long-term relationships.  First, there
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is concern that if the government does not own program data
rights, follow-on competition could be hindered.  Second,
there appears to be confusion that requirements are not
stable during the core capability.  Third, there seems to
be some apprehension about the government entering into
long-term relationships. 
2. The Industrial Base
a. Purpose
There is a continuing trend toward corporate
“mergers and acquisitions, which reduces the number of
potential suppliers available” in the Defense Industry
(PRT, 1999, 4).  The researcher contends that U.S. Defense
industry remains the world leader even though “defense
dollars are dwindling and the industrial base is shrinking”
(Cahlink, 2001, 31).  DODR 5000.2-R requires that PMs
address the industrial base capabilities within the
acquisition strategy and advise the DOD Component
Acquisition Executive when capabilities are in danger of
being lost (DoDR 5000.2-R, 2001, 47).  The financial health
of the industrial base is questionable due to decreasing
budgets throughout the 1990’s coupled with significant
reductions in research and development spending.  The
responses in respect to how EA will affect the industrial
base are as follows:
Advantages:
• When conducted properly, EA will permit early
development and production of weapon systems that
should help maintain a viable industrial base. 
This should allow for more efficient
implementation of programs within budget
constraints.
• Flexibility will be instilled in the acquisition
strategy.  If the prime contractor for the
initial capability is a “dead horse” (non-
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performer), the flexibility of the EA approach
will allow other, possibly new, contractors to
compete in follow-on phases or increments.
• EA will support and help maintain a viable
industrial base because only the best contractors
will remain.  The advantage of EA is that long-
term relationships will be formed providing
positive affects on life cycle planning and
support.  Additionally, a consistent vendor base
will diminish the level of parts obsolescence.
Disadvantages:
• Long-term commitment to a single contractor will
increase the viability of that specific
contractor but will harm the health of others
remaining in the industry.
• The industry will suffer because long-term
relationships will drive potential competitors
from the market, limiting the amount of new or
“refreshed” technology.  
• With the emphasis on open architectures,
commercial and dual use technology will become
commonplace.  The government is now forced to
compete with the commercial industry for breaking
technology.  
b. Summary
The responses of those who perceive EA as being
advantageous to the industry are focused in two areas:
obtaining the most capable contractors and forcing out
contractors that don’t perform.  First, contractor
performance must meet or exceed the contract requirements. 
Contractors must perform or be replaced by other
traditional and non-traditional contractors.  Second,
“rightsizing” is transpiring in the industrial base.  Those
contractors who don’t perform will be forced out, opening
the door for expansion in the industry.  
The responses of those who perceive EA as being
disadvantageous to the industry are focused in two areas:
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concern about long-term relationships and increased
reliance on commercial and dual-use technologies.  First,
the belief is that long-term relationships will impede
other contractors’ opportunity to compete while
simultaneously driving them out of the industry.  Second,
weapon systems are more software and technology driven,
providing numerous opportunities for use of commercial and
dual-use technologies.  This trend will force DOD to




Risk can be thought of or described in terms of
its dimensions and its relationship to uncertainty. 
Outcomes, both positive and negative, are considered. 
“Parameters are established to consider how much risk is
used and whether combinations of risk will be regarded as
descriptive of the whole.” (Shapira, 1995, 2-24)  The
acquisition strategy shall address risk.  “The PM shall
identify the risk areas of the program and integrate risk
management within overall program management.” (DoDR
5000.2-R. 2001, 29)  The responses to how EA will affect
risk are as follows:  
Contracting Personnel:
• The majority of contracting personnel believed
that, overall, risk would be reduced under an EA
approach.  With respect to the three major areas
of risk (performance, schedule and cost), almost
50% of contracting respondents believed
performance risk was the most important measure
of risk.  Schedule and cost risk received 5 and 4
votes, respectively.  There were 5 respondents
who “did not know” how EA affects risk.  
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• Likewise, the majority of program management
personnel believed risk would be reduced under an
EA approach.  Unlike contracting personnel, 8 of
16 PM respondents believed cost risk was the most
important measure of risk.  Performance and
Schedule risk received 4 and 3 votes,
respectively.  There was 1 respondent with no
opinion.   











Table 4.2. Effect EA Will Have on Risk.
Source: Developed by Researcher
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Table 4.3. Most Important Areas of Risk.
Source: Developed by Researcher
 
b. Summary
There seems to be a consensus from both
contracting and program management personnel; that an EA
approach will reduce overall risk.  However, there is no
consistency between the beliefs of contracting and program
management personnel on the type of risk that is most
significant.  Contracting personnel believe performance
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risk is most significant while program management personnel
favor cost risk.  
4. Acquisition Workforce
a. Purpose
“The workforce will need new skills and perhaps
adopt a new mindset to enable it to contribute effectively
in the changing environment of the 21st century.” (PRT,
1999, 5)  The readiness of the total acquisition workforce
is paramount if acquisition reform objectives are to be
met.  The responses to how will EA affect the workload on
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Table 4.4. Effects of EA on Workforce Workload.
[Source: Developed by Researcher]

Contracting Personnel:
The majority of respondents believe there will be
no increase in the workload of contracting personnel.  The
rationale for those respondents who believe workload will
be increased is outlined below:
• Multiple award contracts for follow-on increments
will increase both planning time and integration
efforts.
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• Re-competition at the end of core capability and
each increment will increase the burden on
acquisition planning.  
• The EA approach will increase the number of
Engineering Change Proposals, and Justifications
and Approvals resulting from competitive source
selections.
Program Management Personnel:
The majority of respondents believe there will be
a marginal to significant increase in workload for program
management personnel.  The rationale for respondents who
believe workload will be increased is outlined below:  
• System engineering requirements with respect to
integrated logistics support reviews,
configuration development, testing and evaluation
and interoperability will provide additional
challenges in an already active environment.
• Longer schedules results in longer periods for
the PM to defend the budget.  The result is
programs that are continually restructured to
support a dynamic budget.
• Training personnel to conduct business under this
fundamentally new approach.  This approach forces
PMs to stay abreast or ahead of technology as it
matures.  
b. Summary 
Contracting and Program Management personnel have
conflicting views regarding how EA will affect personnel
workload.  Overall, the preponderance of contracting
personnel support the position that there will be no
increase in workload on DOD personnel.  Conversely, program
management personnel believe there will be at least some




5. Multi-Year Procurement Funding
a. Purpose  
United States Code (USC) Title 10, Section 2306b
requires certain criteria to be met before MYP funding can
be used.  Three of these requirements are of specific
concern if an EA concept is to be used.  These requirements
are: substantial savings, stable requirements, and stable
design. 
Additionally, the Fiscal Year 1998 DOD
Authorization Act made the following changes to United
States Code (USC) Title 10, Section 2306b.  MYPs cannot be
awarded for greater than $500 million without written act
of law in the form of an appropriation act and an “other
than appropriation act”. (NDA, 1998, sec 806)  The EA
concept may have difficulty meeting the Title 10 criteria
and the DoD Authorization Act financial threshold.  Based
on the above issues, Table 4.5 outlines responses to the













Table 4.5. Will EA Reduce the Number of MYPs.
Source: Developed by Researcher

The majority of both contracting and program
management personnel believe the EA will not affect the
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number of MYP contracts within DOD.  However, there were
concerns on both sides regarding fiscal policy and design
stability.  The responses are paraphrased below:
• Unless there is significant change in fiscal
policy and laws, an EA approach will be
challenged on Capitol Hill.  Historically, it is
difficult to get Congress on the side of DOD when
MYP is the subject.
• MYPs can be increased under an EA approach if
senior acquisition managers can illustrate to
Congress that the DOD is fully devoted to an
acquisition and will continually fund it over
time.  
• EA by definition has an unstable design for
longer periods as compared to a traditional
procurement.  It will be difficult to win a
political battle when DOD cannot adhere to the
basic guidelines for MYPs.  A requirement of MYP
is stable designs and mature technology.
• Potentially, MYPs can be increased if programs
can take advantage of an open architecture for
its basic hardware and this hardware remains
basically intact throughout fielding.  Changes
can only occur in software related technologies.  
b. Summary  
The consensus is that EA and MYP are a prudent
combination when the criteria for both approaches are met. 
There are two points that must be accepted and supported,
fiscal policy and strong backing by DOD.  Within USC Title
10, Congress has provided specific criteria for MYPs, and
they are unyielding when it comes to waivers. 
Additionally, DOD must fully support programs selected for
MYP throughout the life of the program.  For a EA program
to be a strong MYP candidate, it must be backed with





a. Purpose  
The FAR states that market research is “the most
suitable approach to acquiring, distributing, and support
supply services” to satisfy agency needs. (FAR, 2001, 191) 
For MDAPs   
the PM shall use market research as a primary
means to determine the availability and
suitability of commercial and non-developmental
items, and the extent to which the interfaces for
these items have broad market acceptance,
standards-organization support, and stability. 
Market research shall support the acquisition
planning and decision process, supplying
technical and business information about
commercial technology and industrial
capabilities. (DoDR 5000.2-R, 2001, 45-46)    
For an EA approach, the key to market research is
understanding how requirements evolve and developing a
strategy to satisfy those requirements.  To support the
strategy the two phases of market research, market
surveillance and market investigation (www.acq-
ref.navy.mil, 2001), must be ongoing and continuous
throughout any program that uses the EA approach.
The results from survey respondents concerning
the role of market research in an EA approach are outlined
in Table 4.6.  Only contracting personnel were asked this
survey question.  During preliminary study on the EA
concept, the researcher concluded that market research was
a core competency of contracting personnel.  Program















Table 4.6. Role of Market Research under an EA
Approach.
Source:  Developed by Researcher

Over 65% of respondents believe market research
will play an increased role under an EA strategy.  Almost
25% of respondents “did not know” how the role of market
research would be affected.  Specific areas of interest are
outlined in Table 4.7.  The survey requested respondents
provide three areas of market research requiring additional
emphasis for an EA approach.  The responses highlighted 7
areas of interest: competition, technology, integration,
COTS, cycle time, supportability and acquisition cost.  The
most prevalent area was technology, which was followed
closely by competition, integration and cycle time.  













Table 4.7. Areas Market Research Will Emphasize.
Source:  Developed by Researcher
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b. Summary
The survey respondents believe market research is
a key component of the overall strategy of acquiring weapon
systems.  The survey responses encompass the entire realm
of market research and show that emphasis is required
during all increments for a program using the EA approach. 
Although only 65% believed the role market research would
increase, all concurred market research continues to be an
important measure of success for all acquisitions.  
7. EA as a Process Improvement
a. Purpose  
In the analysis chapter, this question will be
analyzed from a business perspective using the BPI
methodology.  Data from respondents concerning EA being an













Table 4.8. Is EA an Improvement of the Acquisition
Process.
Source: Developed by Researcher

There is not a consensus by either the
contracting or program management personnel with respect to
EA being a improvement over the traditional approach.  A
concern is the number of respondents who “did not know”. 
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Over 45% of contracting personnel “did not know” while
about 20% of program management personnel followed suit.  
Of the contracting personnel who determined EA is
an improvement, 9 of 10 have worked on programs that use EA
concepts.  A similar trend is prevalent with program
management personnel; 7 of 7 respondents who believe EA is
an improvement have EA experience.  There are 2 program
management respondents with EA program experience who do
not believe EA is an improvement.  
b. Summary  
The lack of practical (programs using EA
concepts) experience by the majority of respondents created
difficulty in effectively answering this question.  Of
those respondents who have experience using the EA concept,
the overwhelming majority felt that EA is an improvement
over the traditional approach.  These differences of
opinions will be analyzed in chapter V.      
8. Issues, Barriers and Concerns
a. Purpose
The primary question for this research asks what
issues, barriers, and concerns must be addressed before DoD
can successfully transition to an EA approach.  The
previous seven sections attempted to identify many of the
issues, barriers, and concerns.  In this final section, the
survey respondents were asked this question, and their
responses are presented below.      
Multiple Configurations
• As multiple configurations of a weapon programs
are presented to the user, life cycle costs are
expected to increase significantly. 
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• Operations and Maintenance funding must be
sufficient to support fielding of multiple
increments.  
• Parts support must be sufficient for each
increment fielded.  
• Configuration changes and modifications must be
carefully monitored to ensure traceability.

Open Systems Architecture 
• Open systems architecture must be truly open. 
With declining defense budgets DOD cannot afford
to spend “good money” after “bad money”.  
• If core capabilities are not workable, don’t tie
up additional funding correcting the original
problem.  Acquisition managers must track the
intent of the original procurement and if it this
goes awry change direction.  

Total Cost Perspective
• When we use EA, the total cost of the program
must be addressed in the original acquisition
strategy.  
• For an EA program to be successful it must
receive full support, both politically and
financially.  DOD has to fully support the
program during the budget process.  

Sole Source Procurement
• Widespread use of EA across DOD could develop
concerns about sole source contracting for
follow-on increments.  Even when it is in the
best interest of the government, sole source
contracting could limit capabilities of future
increments and initiate numerous legal concerns

User Understanding
• The user must fully understand evolutionary
development and what the contract will deliver.  
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• The acquisition managers can control the
independent variables, like schedule and CAIV,
where appropriate.  Acquisition managers cannot
control performance, which is the customer’s
expectation.    

PPBS Cycle
• EA fails to address a real problem, the Planning
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS).  
• Upfront stable funding is critical for the
process to be successful. This fortifies the need
for teamwork from top to bottom and throughout
the acquisition process.  

Inflated Requirements
• The ORD and Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC) must be in agreement.  
• Key Performance Parameters (KPP) must be well
defined and suitable for user needs.  
• We cannot succeed by inflating KPPs just because
they are nice to have.  This will ultimately slow
fielding of the core or incremental capabilities.
b. Summary 
The respondents outlined 8 broad areas of issues,
barriers and concerns that must be addressed before the
successful implementation of EA.  These areas require
involvement from the user, contracting and program
management personnel, senior DOD executives and Congress. 
To address these areas, DOD must look at the total process
and base decisions on meeting the user objectives. 
Understanding requirements, program support, collaboration
and teaming are keys in addressing these areas of concern.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter, the researcher presented survey
responses from knowledgeable DOD contracting and program
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management personnel who have major weapon system
acquisition experience.  The responses provided insight on
the core competencies of contracting and program management
personnel and how they correlate to an EA approach. 
Furthermore, the responses looked at the EA concept and
provided insight on evaluating it as an improvement
compared to the traditional acquisition approach.  Finally,
the survey provided potential issues, barriers and concerns
that could hinder the successful implementation of an EA
approach.
The next chapter analyzes these areas of focus and
potential issues, barriers and concerns with respect to
implementing the EA concept.  The analysis is aligned
around the research questions in Chapter I and based on
respondents’ answers presented in Chapter III.  
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IV. ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS
A. INTRODUCTION
Given the uncertainty of defense budgets and future
needs, acquisition managers must utilize every tool
available to effectively streamline business practices
while simultaneously maximizing efficiency.  The analysis
in this chapter is aligned around the research questions
from Chapter I.  Survey data from Chapter III outlined six
“areas of focus”.  The areas of focus from Chapter III are:
Competition, Defense Industrial Base, Risk Management,
Acquisition Workforce, Multi-Year Procurement, Market
Research, Functional Improvement, and Issues, Barriers and
Concerns.
In addition to the areas of focus, the data for two
other questions are presented.  These questions are: Is EA
a functional improvement of the acquisition process, and
what are the issues, barriers and concerns associated with
using an EA approach.    
B. WHAT ARE THE NEW REQUIREMENTS
This section analyzes the survey respondents’ concerns
about new requirements in the above areas of focus and
their responses to two additional questions.  This research
has determined that not all survey respondents’ concerns
reflect new requirements.  Specifically why they are not
new requirements will be addressed in the sections below.   
1. Competition
In Table 4.1, the respondents’ results were
inconclusive.  The slight majority of contracting personnel
believe that competition will have a negative effect on
programs using an EA approach.  Respondents outline several
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new issues or concerns regarding competition.  They are
data rights, requirements identification, and long-term
relationships.  Some of these issues or concerns are
identified as new requirements later in this section. 
Others are presented for what their actual role will be
under an EA approach.  Reasoning for each is addressed in
the following paragraphs.  
Respondents state that contractors will be reluctant
to lose data rights because they may lose their competitive
edge.  They also believe the incremental nature of EA will
either force the government to purchase data rights or
establish sole source procurements for programs using EA
more often.  Of course, the concern about data rights is
not new; data rights have long been a concern under the
traditional approach.  DoD has purchased data rights in the
past when it was necessary to enhance competition in the
industry.  Additionally, if a sole source procurement is
required, FAR Part 6 outlines criteria for other than full
and open competition.  The issue of data rights may become
an issue more often but it is not a new requirement.  
According to contracting survey respondents, the
requirements identification process must be clear and
adequately identified.  With a limited number of new weapon
systems being developed and the significant cost associated
with developing proposals, contractors may be reluctant to
submit proposals if there is any concern about hard
requirements.  Again, under the traditional and other
acquisition approaches, the need for clear and adequately
defined requirements has always been an issue or concern. 
In every system acquisition, the DoD 5000 model
incorporates milestone decision reviews that validate
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requirements.  Specifically, for a program to enter
Milestone C it must have an approved ORD and an approved
acquisition strategy.  These documents cannot be developed
properly if the requirements are not clear and defined. 
Finally, these documents provide detailed information that
is later outlined in a proposal.  When an EA approach is
used, each incremental ORD must meet the same criteria for
clear and defined requirements.  Therefore, the researcher
believes the respondents’ issues concerning clearly defined
requirements are not new requirements.  In this situation,
it appears that respondents confused the characteristic of
evolving requirements to mean unclear and undefined.  This
is far from the truth when an EA approach is used.           
Respondents believe there is a significant tradeoff
between long-term partnering and competition.  The
researcher agrees that there should be concern about long-
term partnering and the effect on competition.  However,
the issue itself is not new.  Throughout the acquisition
community long-term partnering and competition are
buzzwords one hears almost routinely.  Franck addresses the
concern with long-term partners in the following passage. 
“Dealing with only one supplier is considered unacceptable,
because of the obvious loss of bargaining advantage and
lack of incentive of innovation.” (Franck, 2001, 4) 
However, Roberson (1998) argues that long-term partnering
and competition is not a new requirement.  He states, “The
minimum acceptable market size for any major defense
product is three firms.” (Roberson, 1998, 91)  These
statements indicate that we should be continually concerned
about long-term partnering and its effect on competition;
however, the researcher believes there is no justification
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for this to be a new requirement under the EA approach.  It
is believed that respondents expressed concern in this area
because of an assumption that the EA approach will provide
an inherent advantage to the initial contractor.  Because
of this, they would expect the majority of follow-on
contracts to be awarded to the original partner and create
unintentional long-term relationships.  DoDR 5000.2-R
supports competition under an EA approach and specifically
addresses full competition between each incremental
release.   
2. Industrial Base
The respondents believe only the best contractors will
survive because market conditions will control the
industry.  Over the last two decades many defense
contractors have consolidated to make themselves more
efficient and attempt to maintain their competitive edge
over other traditional players in the industry.  For
example, since 1985 Boeing Aircraft has acquired McDonnell
Douglas, ARCO Systems, UTL Corporation and Rockwell (JLCG,
1998, Fig. I.1).  Conversely, of the 100 or so contractors
the Navy made procurements with in FY2000, there are a
significant number of non-traditional names.  Companies and
organizations like Motorola, MIT, John Hopkins University,
AT&T, B.F. Goodrich, Proctor and Gamble, Dell, Pacific Gas
& Electric and Philip Morris (www.govexec.com, 2001) are
gaining increasing percentages of defense dollars.  The
evolution of defense procurement is allowing previously
non-traditional players to gain increasing market share
within the defense industry.  This is advantageous to DoD
and an issue for concern, however, it is obviously not a
new requirement. 
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Respondents also believe the marketplace for
technology is expanding and DoD must take full advantage of
commercial and dual-use technologies that are available in
the commercial industry.  The EA concept requires DoD to
compete for the best technology from a “world” of
competitors.  New technology and breakthroughs surface
almost on daily basis.  DoD has made provisions in the past
to ensure DoD harbors new technology and breakthroughs when
they are appropriate and meet the needs of our users.  Both
the FAR and DoDR 5000.2-R addressed commercial and dual-use
technology before the EA concept was officially approved in
October 2000.  This issue is and will continue to a major
concern for a long time, but again, it is not a new
requirement that must be addressed under an EA approach.    
3. Risk Management
In Table 4.3, there is lack of consensus between
contracting and program management personnel on the most
prevalent type of risk.  This indicates that these managers
view program execution from two distinct perspectives. 
Simply put, contracting personnel are more concerned with
administration and contract performance and thus lean
toward performance risk.  In contrast, program management
personnel are accountable to the users, senior DOD
acquisition executives and Congress for overall management
of a program.  Cost is the most visible aspect of
management and thus the most important risk factor to PMs. 
The FAR and DoDR 5000.2-R are in agreement that risk must
be addressed in every acquisition, but risk has been
addressed in this manner for many years and long before the
EA concept began.  
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Like the traditional approach, the relationship
between contracting and program management personnel on a
program using the EA concept should be a critical component
for success.  Indeed it may alleviate problems if these
managers establish stronger relationships and become more
appreciative of the others’ view on risk.  Any type of risk
reduction or avoidance in extremely important, but the
issue of risk in programs using an EA approach is not a new
requirement.   
4. Acquisition Workforce
The majority of contracting personnel view contract
execution as a single separate event.  They believe the
same is true when it applies to an EA approach even when it
necessitates two or more follow-on contracts.  Thus, from
the contracting perspective, there is no obvious change in
workload or issues to be addressed when the EA approach is
used.  From the PM perspective, EA creates a multitude of
incremental cycles or phases.  All core competencies of
program management are challenged because as programs
evolve from one increment to the next each competency is
revisited.  Thus, program management personnel believe
their workload will increase under an EA approach.  
The researcher believes there is a new requirement
concerning the acquisition workforce.  The new requirement
is training for the acquisition workforce on the EA
concept.  Looking at the statistical data from Table 4.4,
there seems to be confusion concerning how this approach
will affect program workload for contract and program
management issues.  For example, there were 7 of 26
contracting respondents who thought EA would increase
workload by 20-50% or more, and an additional 3 respondents
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“did not know”.  Although the majority of contracting
personnel thought EA would not affect the workload, there
is a wide variance between those who thought the workload
would change.  For program management personnel, 12 of 16
respondents thought workload would increase. 
Statistically, 50% of these personnel thought the workload
increase would be greater than 50%.  From these statistics
it is clear there are many unknowns within the acquisition
workforce concerning the EA approach.  Obviously, training
on the EA approach is warranted in order to clarify their
differences and help determine the true effect on the
acquisition workforce.         
5. Multi-Year Procurement
U.S.C. Title 10 and the 1998 DoD Authorization Act
outline specific criteria for MYP approval.  These
regulatory requirements already present stringent criteria
for MYP approval under the traditional approach; adding EA
only increases the difficulty of the process because of the
need for additional collaboration and support from DoD
acquisition managers.  Survey respondents believe EA will
not reduce the number of MYP contracts when an EA approach
is used; thus there is no issue to address.        
In turn, the researcher believes that senior DoD staff
and Congressional staff must collaborate and revise MYP
criteria for the EA approach.  The current criteria will
stifle the majority of programs that use the EA approach. 
Specifically, two of the six criteria for MYP are stable
design and substantial savings.  The uniqueness of the EA
approach emphasizes an incremental capability to the user. 
This contradicts the criteria for a stable design and
essentially nullifies MYP as a possible funding strategy. 
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The EA approach cannot even be considered if it can’t meet
the basic MYP criteria.  
When total program costs are compared to the series of
annual contracts, MYP criteria requires there to be
substantial savings.  Because of incremental capabilities
associated with the EA approach, it is difficult to
forecast future system costs for one year, not to mention
several.  The same logic applies here; if it is not
possible to meet the basic criteria, it is also not
possible to be considered for MYP funds.  If DoD is to make
MYP a viable funding option under an EA approach, changes
to the current MYP criteria must be made.  
6. Market Research
The respondents believe the role of market research
will be increased under an EA approach.  This issue is
outlined in Table 4.7 where respondents identified seven
different areas of market research that require additional
emphasis.  The continually changing nature of EA approach
requires managers to stay abreast of new and emerging
technology as programs evolve from one increment to the
next.  To support the emphasis on market research effort,
DoDR 5000.2-R “requires the acquisition strategy to include
the results of completed market research and plans for
future market research.” (DoDR 5000.2-R, 2001, 46)  The FAR
also supports the role of market research.  FAR Part 10
emphasizes the use of commercial and non-developmental
items that may meet the needs of the user.  
There are two components of market research: market
surveillance and market investigation.  Under EA, the role
of market investigation will be emphasized more often. 
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Market investigation is normally for a specific
requirement.  EA’s incremental nature creates two or more
specific requirements causing the market investigation role
to surface several times during an EA approach.  
7. Issues, Barriers, and Concerns
a. Multiple Configurations
As part of any acquisition strategy, the PM is
required to develop a “support strategy for life cycle
sustainment and continuous improvement of product
affordability, reliability, and supportability, while
sustaining readiness.” (DoDR 5000.2-R, 35)  When compared
to the traditional approach, issues associated with
multiple configurations under an EA approach are amplified. 
This issue is a new requirement because the PMs must
establish a new framework for developing and tracking
multiple configurations that ensures adequate traceability. 
Specifically, the support strategy for multiple
configurations may create challenges from a management and
financial standpoint.  
For management, each increment must have a detailed
support strategy that allows for contractor logistics
support (CLS), integration of manpower, safety, training
and numerous other considerations.  As the number of
increments increase, maintaining a detailed but separate
support strategy for each requires a massive effort.  This
management effort is compounded when increments are
produced and fielded by different defense contractors.  
From a financial standpoint, the PM is bound by the
competitive process to select the support strategy that
provides the best value to the DoD.  Although multiple
source competition is encouraged, it is more difficult to
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find the most efficient and cost effective mix for the
various management considerations (CLS, manpower, safety
etc.).  With sustained readiness being the objective, PMs
will be challenged to maintain seamless but adequate
controls over multiple configurations.     
b. Open Systems Architecture
Open systems architecture may be an issue that
must be addressed, but it is not a new requirement.  Open
system architecture has been used effectively under the
traditional and other acquisition strategies.  For example,
the Army’s THAAD system provided the user an initial
missile defense capability and upgraded that capability in
the next phase of development.  This program used EA
methods but was managed under a traditional approach.  
c. Total Cost Perspective
Each EA program must be viewed from a total cost
perspective that takes in account anticipated costs of all
increments.  PMs are required to look at all programs from
a macro perspective.  Specifically, the acquisition
strategy requires the PM to “develop an acquisition
strategy in preparation for program initiation, prior to a
program initiation decision, and update it prior to all
major program decisions points or whenever the approved
acquisition strategy changes.” (DoDR 5000.2-R, 2001, 27) 
As the overall responsible manager for a program, the PM
has always been required to see the big picture, and this
includes total cost.        
d. User Understanding
Survey respondents believe the lack of interface
between the user and program office creates dissension
concerning the overall program management process.  This
issue indicates a new requirement because users do not
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understand the true benefits of the EA approach.  Program
offices must communicate and train the user on the
characteristics of EA.  For example, a user requests a
specific requirement (capability) by year 2010.  The PM is
tasked to meet the requirement and schedule.  Under EA, the
PM may be able to provide the user an incremental
capability by 2004, and upgrade in 2007 and a final
capability by 2010.  The EA approach does not diminish the
user’s original requirement.  What EA provides is
capability earlier in the life cycle and upgrades along the
way. 
e. PPBS Cycle
If long-term stable funding is an issue for a
traditional program, clearly it is an issue under an EA
approach.  Several respondents stated that the PPBS cycle
is an issue but failed to provide specific concerns. 
Respondents claim upfront stable funding and a need for
teamwork is the major concerns for this issue.  Because
respondents provided only minimal information on this
issue, the researcher cannot determine the nature of this
new requirement.  What can be determined is that further
investigation is required to see how EA programs are
affected by the PPBS cycle.    
f. Inflated Requirements
Respondents believe inflating requirements under
an EA approach will extend the development period and delay
fielding.  This fact may be true, but the issue is not a
requirement.  This issue is a problem under the traditional
approach and is a reason the traditional approach takes so
long to field systems.  For example, under the traditional
approach if one of the KPPs is not attainable for many
years, this is essentially an inflated requirement.  The EA
66 
approach minimizes the fielding time because of the
incremental capabilities and limits KPPs and technology to
something that attainable in a specified period of time. 
Thus, inflated requirements are an issue but not a new
requirement.   

C. EFFECTS ON THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY
The section analyzes the survey responses concerning
the effect EA will have on the defense industry.  Only the
area of focus that is applicable to the defense industry
perspective is analyzed.  These areas of focus are: the
industrial base and risk management.  Additionally, the
issues, barriers, and concerns that affect the defense
industry are analyzed.   
1. Industrial Base
A concern of respondents is that accelerated delivery
and shorter life cycles could hinder contractors from
bidding on proposals.  The effect on the defense industry
is that the industry must change their mindset away from
that of the traditional perspective of slow system
development and fielding.  The traditional mindset is a
slow fielding process that depends on technology
availability and KPPs viability.  Recent mergers and
acquisitions in the defense industry have done much to
change its mindset and provide contractors infrastructure
to efficiently support a wider range DoD performance
parameters.  Now, the industry must implement these
efficiencies under an EA approach.  As a recent example of
the change in mindset, the Marine Division of General
Dynamics has put forth a proposal to purchase Newport News
Shipbuilding.  General Dynamics is currently working on the
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new Virginia Class submarine and Arleigh Burke class
destroyer.  This proposed merger should provide General
Dynamics more innovation and dual-use opportunities to meet
DoD performance requirements in several of its defense
programs.   
2. Risk Management
In table 4.2, the respondents indicated overall risk
management under an EA strategy is reduced.  Risk may be
lower on the defense industry because of the inherent
flexibility in the EA approach.  Under the traditional
approach, the contractor has one opportunity to meet the
requirements without flaw.  When the EA approach is used,
the contractor has two or more attempts to meet the final
capability.  Performance risk is reduced.  This may result
in programs that are progressing in attainable increments
instead of revolutionary leaps. 
3. Issues, Barriers and Concerns
Respondents believe the development of multiple
configurations under an EA approach will intensify
contractor involvement with respect to repair parts support
and maintenance.  The defense industry must accept the
challenge of supporting several variations of current
weapon system.  This challenge is different from the
support and maintenance required for block upgrades under
the traditional approach.  The EA approach requires the
industry to think in terms of “months and increments”
instead of “years and blocks”. 
D. IS EA A FUNCTIONAL IMPROVEMENT OF THE ACQUISITION
PROCESS
This section analyzes the final research question of
whether EA is a functional improvement of the acquisition
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process.  Analysis in this section is based on respondents
data presented in Chapter IV.       
Survey Analysis
Survey results show that 17 of 42 respondents believe
EA is a functional improvement over the traditional
approach.  Separated by profession, this equates to 40% of
contracting and only 20% of program management personnel
who contend EA is a functional improvement.  There is no
basis for proving EA is a functional improvement based on
these statistics.  There were two specific concerns about
the data associated with this question: the number of
respondents who stated they “did not know” and statistics
associated with respondents who have used EA methods in
practice.
There were 15 of 42 (over 33%) respondents who stated
they “did not know” to this question.  This means that
these managers are aware of the EA approach and its
methodologies, but without practical experience on a true
EA program a determination could not be made. 
Additionally, 100% (9 of 9) contracting personnel and 78%
(7 of 9) program management personnel who have used EA
methods on programs believe the EA approach is an
improvement over the traditional process.  The researcher
felt this was not a basis for stating that the EA approach
is an improvement because these programs used EA methods
only.  They were not true EA programs.  These responses do
indicate, however, the potential that EA may indeed be an
improved acquisition approach.
Since this research has found no programs that utilize
EA, the researcher believes this question cannot be
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answered using survey data alone.  Data from true EA
programs are necessary to reach a finding.  
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
EA appears to be a relevant and critical acquisition
tool that will allow managers to make informed decisions
about the management of MDAPs.  This chapter provided an
analysis of the research questions outlined in Chapter I. 
The analysis addressed three areas: the new requirements EA
will place on DoD; the effects EA will have on the defense
industry: and the validity that EA is a functional
improvement over the traditional acquisition process.  
The next chapter presents conclusions derived from
this research as well as recommendations associated with
the research questions.  The chapter concludes by providing
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This thesis evaluated the use of Evolutionary
Acquisition (EA) using survey responses from experienced
DoD acquisition managers.  These responses were used to
answer the primary and two of four secondary questions. 
The remaining secondary questions were answered using a
literature review and a business methodology.
In this closing chapter, the researcher provides
answers to the primary and secondary research questions
outlined in Chapter I.  Next, the chapter provides
conclusions and recommendations derived from this research
effort with respect to using EA in the DoD.  Finally, this
thesis concludes by providing recommended areas for further
research.  
B. REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question asks what issues must
DoD address before successfully using an EA procurement
strategy.  Because many of these issues are addressed in
the secondary research questions they will be focused on
first.
1. Secondary Research Questions
• What is the background and history of
Evolutionary Acquisition?
It is determined that the EA concept has been in
existence in commercial applications since the mid 1970’s. 
In 1987 it was first introduced as a military concept as a
future development for the Joint Logistics Commanders Guide
(JLCG) as a means to reduce the time to efficiently upgrade
command and control (C2) systems.  The JLCG was revised in
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1995 and 1998, respectively, to support the increased
emphasis on technology and further support the EA concept
as a viable acquisition process.    
Lessons from several acquisition programs like the F-
117 and Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system
have laid the groundwork and policy basis for creating EA. 
Several EA pilot programs like the Navy Tactical Command
Support System (NTCSS) and Battle Force Electronic Warfare
Trainer (BEWT) were introduced in the 1980’s and 1990s and
used EA methods to support follow-on upgrades and
technology changes in weapon systems.  Most recently, the
former Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Rudy de
Leon, approved EA as an alternate strategy in October 2000.    
• What new requirements does this acquisition
approach place on the Department of Defense?
The EA approach puts additional pressure on many core
competencies of contracting and program management.  The
researcher identified three areas where new influence must
be directed to allow an EA strategy to be effectively used
in DoD.
Acquisition Workforce.  Unlike contracting personnel,
program management personnel believe EA will create
additional challenges to the acquisition workforce.  Having
two different perspectives points out that there is no
clear understanding of the EA concept with respect to
workload.  The acquisition workforce needs training on the
EA concept to be able to take full advantage of the
benefits.  
Multi-Year Procurement.  The responses indicate 31 of
42 respondents believe that EA will not reduce the number
of MYPs.  However, the characteristics of EA indicate new
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requirements regarding MYP.  Senior DoD staff and
Congressional staff must collaborate and revise MYP
criteria for the EA approach.  The regulatory requirements
for MYP are stringent and were developed based on the
traditional approach.  This is a new requirement because
DoD must push to have these requirements revised.  
Market Research.  The continually changing nature of
EA requires acquisition managers to stay abreast of new and
emerging technology as an EA program progresses.  According
to respondents, EA will create a broader scope of market
research to look at.  They highlighted seven areas where
market research requires additional emphasis.  This is new
because of the increased emphasis.  
• What are the possible effects of the new
acquisition approach on the defense industry?
EA creates challenges not only for DoD but the defense
industry as well.  This research identified one area where
EA will affect the defense industry.  
Industrial Base.  The effect on the defense industry
is that the industry must change their mindset away from
that of the traditional perspective of slow system
development and fielding.  The traditional mindset is a
slow fielding process that depends on technology
availability and KPPs viability.  The industry must take
advantage of innovation and technology gains through
mergers and acquisitions to allow it to succeed in the
dynamic environment of EA.  
Risk Management.  Performance risk is positively
affected because the contractor has several opportunities
to meet the final capability.  This may result in programs
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that are more manageable because the program is progressing
in attainable increments instead of revolutionary leaps
• Is Evolutionary Acquisition a functional
improvement of the acquisition process?
Based on survey responses, it could not be determined
if EA is an improvement of the acquisition process. 
Although some survey respondents had worked on MDAPs that
incorporated EA methods, no respondent had worked on a
program that fully utilized an EA approach for the life
cycle of the program.  It is not possible to fully answer
this question until true EA programs can be analyzed.
2. Primary Research Question
The secondary research questions outlined six areas of
focus that must be addressed under an EA approach.  The
researcher has determined that these four areas of focus
are also issues that DoD must address to successfully use
EA as a procurement strategy.  The primary research
question outlines additional issues realized from survey
results and follow-up telephone interviews.  These issues
are provided below.  Issues outlined in the secondary
research questions are not included.  
• What issues must be addressed to allow the
Department of Defense to successfully utilize an
Evolutionary Acquisition approach.
Multiple Configurations.  The challenge of multiple
configurations is intensified under an EA strategy.  The PM
is required to develop a support strategy that will provide
logistical support for each increment of an EA program. 
The PMs must establish a new framework for developing and
tracking multiple configurations that ensures adequate
traceability.  
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Open Systems Architecture.  Open systems architecture
was first used under the traditional approach.  It
continues to be an issue under EA because of the emphasis
on competition of new requirements between increments. 
DoDR 5000.2-R requires PMs to promote competition between
increments.  Open systems architecture has proven itself
under the traditional approach as an economical means of
upgrading or changing technology within weapon systems. 
For EA to meet the competitive objectives, systems must be
truly open and allow competitors opportunity to meet the
requirements of the next increment.
Sole-Source Procurement.  All incremental contracts
for an EA approach must be autonomous with respect to
follow-on increments or contracts.  If competition is not
practical, proper documentation (Justification and
Approvals at the CAE or DAE level) is required. 
Contracting and program management personnel must be
proactive in following regulatory guidance for “full
competition” and “other than full and open competition”.  
User Understanding.  PMs must keep users apprised of
the benefits of an EA program.  The EA approach is designed
to accomplish this but will not achieve it unless the
program office proactively promotes it.  Because EA is in
its infancy stages, few users truly understand its
benefits.  This is a training issue for the user.  The PMs
must remember that they are also working for the user and
thus must keep them abreast of program status.  This is a
management issue for the PM.  
PPBS Cycle.  This is an issue because survey responses
did not provide sufficient information to allow a position
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to be developed.  Further investigation is required
concerning how the PPBS cycle will affect the EA approach.  
Inflated Requirements.  Like the traditional approach,
inflated requirements will continue to be an issue under
EA.  The focus of requirements is on the ORD and
specifically, KPPs.  The advantage of an EA program is lost
when KPPs outlined in each incremental ORD are inflated
with “nice to haves” and not based on anticipated mature
technology.  KPPs must be meticulously managed for the full
benefits of the EA approach to be achieved.   
C. CONCLUSIONS
Analysis of survey results and follow-on interviews
have led the researcher to the following conclusions
concerning the use of EA in the DoD.    
Conclusion 1:  The acquisition workforce does not
truly understand the issues and characteristics of an EA
approach.  Training is necessary for DoD to take full
benefit of this acquisition approach.  
Conclusion 2:  The industrial base must change its
mindset away from a traditional perspective.  It must stop
thinking in terms of years and block but instead months and
increments.  
Conclusion 3:  It is very difficult to meet the MYP
criteria if an EA approach is used.  Stable funding and
substantial savings are not characteristics of an EA
approach. 
Conclusion 4:  Market research must be emphasized
under an EA approach if the full benefits are to be
received.  
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Conclusion 5:  Contracting and program management
personnel are not in agreement on the most important
aspects of risk as it relates to EA programs.  Contracting
and program management personnel must work together to
evaluate risk and keep programs moving forward.  
Conclusion 6:  The acquisition community must take
greater steps to ensure traceability is maintained over
multiple configurations.  The defense industry must accept
additional responsibility of supporting several increments
by maintaining adequate internal capacity to support
current readiness and future upgrades to full capability.  
Conclusion 7:  It is unclear how the PPBS cycle will
affect an EA program.  Further investigation is required
when true EA programs are developed.   
One important reason EA shows resilience as an
acquisition strategy is that many of its individual
characteristics are proven under different conditions.  A
well-planned architecture and capability achieved
incrementally are just two of these characteristics.  An
example of a well-planned architecture is the NTCSS.  Even
with recent technology advances, the NCTSS base
architecture has supported 15 years progress and upgrades. 
The Army’s THAAD program hallmarks incremental development. 
It made upgrades in two incremental stages that provided
users an initial and improved capability.  If EA is looked
by individual characteristic it is not a new approach at
all.  However, when all the characteristics are combined,
the EA concept, although unproven, is a dynamic acquisition
strategy that appears to be an effective alternative to the
traditional approach.   
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
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Based on the conclusions of this research, the
following recommendations are provided:  
Recommendation 1: Conduct more training on how to
effectively use market research so DoD can take advantage
of new entrants, commercial and dual-use technologies in
the market place.
Recommendation 2: Develop guidelines or modify current
guidelines to ensure multiple configurations are
effectively upgraded as an EA program progresses.  
Recommendation 3: Develop separate criteria or modify
current criteria so the EA concept can be used for MYP
funding when DoD determines it is appropriate.   
Recommendation 4: When an EA approach is selected as
the acquisition strategy, have the program office train
users on the benefits of the approach. 
Recommendation 5: Develop a joint DoD and
Congressional staff panel to investigate the role of EA and
how the PPBS cycle will affect its usage.
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The researcher poses the following areas for further
study:
• Conduct an in depth evaluation of the Multi-Year
Procurement process with respect to Evolutionary
Acquisition programs.  Determine what actions
will increase approvals for multi-year funding.
• Several respondents complained about the
contracting officer and program manager
relationship on a wide variety of issues. 
Recommend further study on the relationship of
these managers and how it can improve the EA
process.     
• When an appropriate number of EA programs are
initiated, further investigate the role of
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competition and determine how this role can
improve the process.
• Develop a market research manual or web-based
tool that will help all acquisition managers
using EA efficiently to seek out commercial and
dual-use technologies.
• Conduct research on how multiple configurations
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APPENDIX A.  EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION SURVEY FOR
CONTRACTING PERSONNEL
1. Please enter your organization (i.e. Navy, Naval Sea
Systems Command)
2. Please enter your name, position, phone number and/or
email.  (All or part is optional).
3. List up to three programs in which your organization
used Evolutionary Acquisition.
4. Do you think Evolutionary Acquisition has a negative




5. If yes, list 3 reasons why Evolutionary Acquisition
will have a negative affect on Competition.  Otherwise
enter N/A.
6. What effect will Evolutionary Acquisition have on
maintaining a viable defense industrial base?  List 3
advantages or disadvantages.
7. Risk management must be addressed in every acquisition




8. Rank the following areas of Risk as it apples to





9. Evolutionary Acquisition emphasizes the use of open-
systems architecture.  Will this emphasis increase the





10. If yes, list 3 areas where Market Research will be
increased (i.e. cost, cycle time, integration,
supportability, competition, technology, etc).

11. By what percentage will Evolutionary Acquisition






12. If you chose 10% or more, specify 3 areas where
Evolutionary Acquisition will increase the workload on
contracting personnel.
13. Do you think Evolutionary Acquisition will reduce the
use of small businesses in executing contracts for
Major Defense Acquisition Programs?  If yes, up to 3
sentences why.
14. Do you think Evolutionary Acquisition will reduce the
number of programs that use Multi-Year Procurement
funding?  If yes, up to three sentences why.
15. What new requirements, other than anything listed
above, do your thing Evolutionary Acquisition will
place on DoD?  List up to 3 requirements.
16. Do you think Evolutionary Acquisition is a functional
improvement over the traditional acquisition approach?
17. Other comments or issues you think are important. 
Thank you very much!
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APPENDIX B.  EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION SURVEYFOR
PROGRAM MANAGERS
1. Please enter your organization (i.e. Navy, Naval Sea
systems Command).
2. Please enter your name, position, phone number and/or
email.  (All or part is optional).
3. List up to 3 programs in which you or your
organization used Evolutionary Acquisition as an
acquisition strategy  
4. Because Evolutionary Acquisition will produce several
blocks/variants of core capabilities, do you believe





5. If yes, list your top 3 logistics/configuration
management issues or concerns.  
6. Risk management must be addressed in every
acquisition strategy.  Do think Evolutionary
Acquisition will:
 Increase Risk
 Decrease Risk 
 Don’t know if it will have a noticeable effect
on   Risk
7. Rank the following areas of Risk as it applies to





8. By what percentage will Evolutionary Acquisition







 Greater than 50%
9. If you chose 10% or more, specify 3 areas where
Evolutionary Acquisition will increase the workload
on program management personnel.  
10. Do you think the recent update of DoDR 5000.2-R fully
supports Evolutionary Acquisition as an acquisition
strategy for Major Defense Acquisition Programs?  If
yes, why?  Up to 3 sentences.
11. Do you think Evolutionary Acquisition will reduce the
number of program that use Multi-Year Procurement? 
If yes, why?  Up to 3 sentences.
12. From the Program Manager perspective, is Evolutionary
Acquisition a new approach or is it a “new name” to a
current acquisition strategy.  If no, explain?  Up to
3 sentences.
13. List your top 3 program management issues, barriers,
or concerns that must be addressed before
Evolutionary Acquisition will work in DoD.
14. What new requirements, other than anything listed
above, does this acquisition strategy place on DoD?
15. Do you think Evolutionary Acquisition is a functional
improvement over the traditional acquisition
approach?
16. Other comments, issues or barriers you think are










APPENDIX C.  LIST OF ACRONYMS
ACAT   Acquisition Category
ADM    Acquisition Decision Memorandum
APB   Acquisition Program Baseline
ASD(C3I) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command,
Control, Communication and Intelligence)
CAE Component Acquisition Executive
DAE Defense Acquisition Executive
CINC Commander in Chief
COTS Commercial, Of-the-Shelf
DoD Department of Defense
DOT&E Director, Test and Evaluation
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation
IPT Integrated Product Team
JROC Joint Requirement Oversight Council
KPP Key Performance Parameters
LRIP Low-Rate Initial Production
MDA Milestone Decision Authority
MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Program
MNS Mission Need Statement
NDI Non-Developmental Item
NMS National Military Strategy
NSS National Security Strategy
OIPT Overarching Integrated Product Team
ORD Operational Requirement Document
OTE Operational Testing and Evaluation
PEO Program Executive Officer
PM Program Manager
PPBS Planning, Programming Budgeting System
SAE Service Acquisition Executive
TEMP   Test and Evaluation Master Plan 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
87 
LIST OF REFERENCES
Axiotis, George, Evolutionary Acquisition and Operational
Testing, Time for a New Approach, NAVSEA T&E Office, May
2000.

Cahlink, George, Partners for Life, pp. 31-36 Government
Executive Magazine, October 2001.

Cohen, Scott A., Using Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy to
Improve the System Acquisition Process: A Case Study of the
Remote Minehunting System, Master’s Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, June 1997.

Cohen, W.S., Report of Quadrennial Defense Review, section
VII, Office of Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., May
1997

Defense Acquisition Deskbook (DAD) Joint Program Office,
Defense Acquisition Deskbook, (CD-ROM) Version, 2000. 

Federal Acquisition Regulation, CCH Incorporated, Chicago,
IL. January 1, 2001.

Franck, Raymond E. Jr., Recent Developments in the Global
Defense Marketplace, pp. 1-5, Naval Postgraduate School,
August 2001.

Harrington, James H., Business Process Improvement, pp. 25-
54, McGraw-Hill 1991.

Henderson Derek E., and Gabb, Andrew P, Using Evolutionary
Acquisition of the Procurement of Complex Systems,
Australian Department of Defense, 1997.

Hirsch, Edward, Evolutionary Acquisition of Command and
Control Systems, Signal, 1985.

Johnson, Collie J., Evolutionary Acquisition – We Need to
Make It the Preferred Way, pp. 8-11, Program Manager
Magazine May-June 1999.

Keller, William C., The Defense Resource Allocation
Process, Newport, RI, Naval War College, 1996.

88 
National Center for Advanced Technology, Proposed
Acquisition Teamwork and Cycle Time Improvements:
Evolutionary Defense Acquisition, Washington, D.C. April
1996.

National Defense Authorization Act of 1982, Sec 909.

National Defense Authorization Act of 1998, Sec. 806.

Roberson, W., The Future of the Defense Industrial Base, p.
91-98, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1998.

Shapira, Zur, Risk Taking: a Managerial Perspective,
Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1995.

Thayer, Richard H. and Merlin Dorfman, System and Software
Requirements Engineering, Tutorial, IEEE Computer Society
Press, California 1990.

The Procurement Round Table, The Federal Acquisition
System; Transitioning into the 21st Century, Washington
D.C., December 1999.

U.S. Air Force, Air Force Evolutionary Acquisition Guide,
November 2000.

U.S. Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, The Defense
Acquisition System, Washington, DC, October 2000.

U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Systems Management
College, Acquisition Strategy Guide, Second Edition, Fort
Belvoir, VA, May 1999.

U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Systems Management
College, Joint Logistics Commanders Guide for the Use of an
Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy in Acquiring Command and
Control (C2) Systems, Fort Belvoir, VA, March 1987.

U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Systems Management
College, Joint Logistics Commanders Guide for Use of
Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy to Acquire Weapon
Systems, Fort Belvoir, VA May 1995.


U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Systems Management
College, Joint Logistics Commanders Guide for Use of
89 
Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy to Acquire Weapon
Systems, Fort Belvoir, VA, June 1998.

U.S. Department of Defense, DoDI 5000.2 Change 1 Operation
of the Defense Acquisition System, Under Secretary of
Defense, January 2001.

U.S. Department of Defense, Mandatory Procedures for Major
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) and Major Automated
Information Systems (MAIS) Acquisition, DODR 50002-R.” 
June 2001.

United States Code, Office of Law Revision Counsel of the
House of Representatives, 2001.  

United States Government, Office of Management and Budget,
Major System Acquisitions: A Discussion of the Application
of OMB Circular No. A-109), Washington, DC, OFPP, 1996.

Von, Rolan, Prototyping – the effective use of Case
Technology, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1990.

www.acq-ref.navy.mil/marketresearch/1module2.htm. Market
research modules 1 and 2.

www.acq-ref.navy.mil/sstories/story_detail.cfm Acquisition
reform website for Department of the Navy Success Stories.

www.govexec.com/news/index.cfm Government Executive























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
91 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Defense Technical Information Center
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 

2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
 Monterey, California 101













6. LCDR Marty Williams 1


